An analysis of 470 Stanford pickup-soccer games (Aug 2024 – Jun 2026), reconstructed from the group's WhatsApp history. Who hands out strikes, who collects them, and whether some people just make strikes more likely by showing up.
Abu is the soft touch. As captain, AbuBakr hands out strikes in only 21% of his games vs. the 63% baseline — the single strongest effect in the entire dataset (Fisher p < 0.001). Everyone else captains roughly at baseline.
Conor is a strike magnet — even when he isn't captain. In games Conor played but someone else captained, the strike rate jumps to 70% vs 56% when he's absent (odds ratio 1.85, p = 0.031). His mere presence on the pitch coincides with more strikes.
Noah is a red herring. His apparent "effect" disappears once you control for captaincy: present-but-not-captain, the rate is 63% vs 63% (OR 1.01, p = 1.0). Noah only looks strike-prone because he captains often and captains strictly.
It's the Conor effect, not a duo effect. When either Conor or Noah is on the field, strikes hit 67% (p = 0.033); when neither is present, it drops to 56% (p = 0.033). But "only Noah" actually dips below baseline (57%), while every Conor-containing scenario sits near 69% — the signal is entirely Conor.
Strikes are concentrated. A handful of repeat offenders absorb most of the punishment: Mwad, Luka, John Rodriguez, and the two Peters lead the leaderboard.
It's a morning league. ~98% of games kick off at 7am; evening games are too rare (~10) to analyze separately.
Strike risk is driven by two people: Abu (who suppresses it as a lenient captain) and Conor (who elevates it, both as the strictest enforcer and as a presence that raises strike odds even when he isn't holding the whistle). Noah, despite the reputation, is noise.
Methodology and full significance tables: see REPORT.md. All rates computed over games that were played and produced a detectable recap.